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Past SGA Changes as a Natural Experiment 
Abstract 
The number of American adults receiving benefits from the Social Security Disability Insurance 
(SSDI) program has increased dramatically over the past several decades. A proposed solution to 
rising program costs is to change program rules to encourage fully or partially recovered SSDI 
beneficiaries to return to work. One such option is a benefit offset policy, which would reduce 
SSDI benefits by $1 for every $2 of earned income. While a benefit offset could generate savings 
from increased labor supply and program exit among current beneficiaries, it could also generate 
unintended costs if the more generous work rules induce significant numbers of working 
individuals to apply for benefits. In this paper we examine how past changes in a closely related 
program parameter, the Substantial Gainful Activity (SGA) threshold, have affected SSDI 
applications. We exploit changes over time and across states in real relative SGA levels, relative 
to local average wages. We find that a 7 percentage point (30%) increase in the real relative SGA 
(on par with the 1999 increase from $500 to $700 per month) was associated with a 4.7% 
increase in applications. 
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1 At present, SSA has commissioned three major studies of the benefit offset, the ongoing Benefit Offset National 
Demonstration Project (see www.ssa.gov/disabilityresearch/offsetnational.htm) and two induced entry 
research design studies (Tuma, 2001; Maestas, Mullen and Zamarro, 2010). 
2 In a related paper, Schimmel, Stapleton and Song (2009) study the effect of the 1999 SGA change on labor supply 
and earnings of current SSDI beneficiaries. They find that approximately 1% of current beneficiaries increased their 
1. Introduction 
The number of American adults receiving benefits from the Social Security Disability 
Insurance (SSDI) program has increased dramatically over the past several decades. Duggan, 
Singleton and Song (2007) estimate that SSDI enrollment increased nearly 50% among 45 to 64-
year old individuals and more than doubled among 25 to 44-year olds between 1983 and 2005. A 
proposed solution to rising program costs is to change program rules to encourage fully or 
partially recovered SSDI beneficiaries to return to work. An example of this type of policy is a 
benefit offset policy. Under such a policy, SSDI benefits would be reduced by $1 for every $2 of 
earnings above the Substantial Gainful Activity (SGA) threshold, rather than fully suspended, as 
under the current rules. Introducing a benefit offset could generate savings if current SSDI 
beneficiaries respond by increasing their earnings above SGA (thereby reducing benefits) or by 
exiting the program (e.g., if the policy encourages beneficiaries to successfully “test” their work 
capacity beyond the Trial Work Period). Yet it could also create unintended costs if the more 
generous work rules induce significant numbers of working individuals to apply for benefits.  
Under the Ticket to Work Incentive and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999, the 
Social Security Administration (SSA) is required to estimate the potential effects of a benefit 
offset on the labor supply of current beneficiaries and on program entry.1  This paper aims to 
provide evidence on the behavioral response on the application margin to past program changes. 
Specifically, we examine how changes in a closely related program parameter, the SGA 















                                                                                                                                                             
     
  
 
threshold arising from inflation as it erodes the value of the nominal SGA threshold over time as 
well as two large increases arising from policy changes in 1990 and 1999. In addition, we make 
use of variation in the relative impact of changes in the SGA threshold across states with 
different average wage levels. 
While there exist no past policy changes that are exactly equivalent to introducing a 
benefit offset, changes in the SGA threshold are quite close inasmuch as they change the 
individual budget constraint in a similar hours/earnings region, and thus offer a potentially 
instructive natural experiment. Like the benefit offset, an increase in the SGA level may prompt 
some beneficiaries to venture into the workforce if the higher threshold makes available new 
options for combining work with benefit receipt; but the availability of new options may also 
make the SSDI program more attractive to new applicants who are currently working. In this 
paper we exploit changes in the SGA threshold as a way to learn about possible induced entry 
effects from a benefit offset. In particular, we present a reduced form estimate of induced entry 
arising from variation in the SGA level. Our preferred estimates imply that the 1999 increase in 
the nominal SGA threshold from $500 to $700 led to a 4.7% increase in SSDI applications, or 
0.2 new SSDI applications per 1,000 individuals . As we discuss below, this estimate is likely to 
be a good approximation of potential induced entry from a benefit offset if the marginal 
applicant has low potential wages 
A range of estimates of the magnitude of potential induced entry under a new benefit 
offset policy currently exist. McLaughlin (1994) estimates the size of the medically eligible non-
beneficiary population with earnings above the SGA using data from the 1978 Survey of 
Disability and Work and, assuming that 20% of this group would apply for benefits, concludes 
earnings above the old SGA level, yet still below the new SGA level, and that another 1% of current beneficiaries
reduced earnings that were previously above both SGA levels to under the new SGA level (that is, they were less 







                                                 







that a $1 for $2 benefit offset would increase the SSDI rolls by roughly 400,000 beneficiaries 
over a 10-year period (approximately 6.4 percent). Hoynes and Moffitt (1999) provide indirect 
evidence on the number of potentially induced entrants; they simulate the financial impacts of a 
$1 for $2 benefit offset, on current and potential SSDI recipients and conclude that the financial 
incentives for entering SSDI under a benefit offset policy may be substantial: part-time (20 
hours/week) workers earning the median wage could more than double their income if they 
entered SSDI under the new rules, and even full-time workers could increase their earnings by 
35-46 percent. Most recently, Benitez-Silva, Buchinsky and Rust (2006) use data from the 
Health and Retirement Study to calibrate a life-cycle model of labor supply and SSDI claiming 
in order to estimate induced entry from a $1 for $2 benefit offset. They estimate that the benefit 
offset would increase SSDI applications by 2.2 percent and SSDI entrants by 3.2 percent.3 
2. Institutional Background 
SSA defines disability as the inability to engage in any substantial gainful work activity 
(SGA) because of a medically-determinable physical or mental impairment that is expected to 
result in death, or that has lasted or is expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 
months. SSA operationalizes this definition by setting a monthly earnings threshold ($1,000 in 
2011) over which individuals are disqualified from receiving SSDI benefits. Thus, the SGA 
threshold is a fundamental program parameter, defining both initial eligibility and ongoing 
entitlement to benefits (after a 9 month (non-consecutive) Trial Work Period (TWP) and 3 month 
3 Other studies (e.g., Black, Daniel and Sanders, 2002; Autor and Duggan, 2003) have established that SSDI 














                                                 
   
 
 
Grace Period, in which new beneficiaries can test their ability to work by posting earnings above 
SGA without penalty).4 
Although the SGA threshold is currently indexed to a measure of average annual wages 
for all employees in the United States, before 2001 the SGA threshold was set nominally and 
only increased infrequently. Between 1980 and 2000, the SGA threshold was raised only twice— 
from $300 to $500 in January 1990 and from $500 to $700 in July 1999. Figure 1 shows the 
evolution of real SGA levels for the non-blind since 1975, expressed in 2009 dollars. The SGA 
amount is expressed in real terms; thus periods during which the SGA decreases in real terms 
correspond to periods where the SGA amount is flat in nominal terms. 
While the SGA level is set nationally, it is relatively more generous in areas with lower 
costs of living and lower average wages compared to areas with higher costs of living and higher 
average wages. In lower-wage areas, applying for SSDI might be more attractive if individuals 
are still able to work in a variety of occupations while still receiving benefits. Similarly, absolute
changes in the national SGA amount will induce different relative changes in different areas of 
the country. To illustrate this, Figure 2A shows the density function of relative changes in the 
SGA amount in 1999, by state, as a percentage of the state average annual wage measured in 
1998. Figure 2B provides an alternative view of the distribution of relative changes in the SGA 
amount in 1999, showing its geographical distribution across states. In 1999, the SGA amount 
rose from $500 to $700 per month, amounting to an average relative change of 8.6 percent of 
average annual wages. Importantly, there is considerable variation in the relative change across 
states; the coefficient of variation for the distribution is 13.2 percent. 





While raising the SGA threshold is not equivalent to introducing a benefit offset (the latter 
eliminates the discontinuity in the beneficiary’s budget constraint, or “cash cliff,” at the hours 
level where earnings exceed the SGA and alters the implicit tax rate for earnings above the 
SGA), the two policies affect the budget constraint in a similar hours/earnings region. Thus past 
SGA changes offer a potentially instructive natural experiment for forecasting induced entry 
effects of the benefit offset if it were to be implemented. Figure 3 illustrates the effects of an 
SGA change and introduction of a benefit offset, respectively, on an individual’s budget 
constraint (after the TWP and Grace Period have elapsed). The solid blue line represents the 
SSDI budget constraint under the current policy. The dotted blue line represents how the budget 
constraint would be affected by a change in the SGA threshold, while the dotted red line 
represents how the budget constraint would be affected by a benefit offset policy. Under the 
current policy, those earning more than the SGA threshold are ineligible to receive SSDI 
benefits. Participants’ net income Y  is reduced by the full cash benefit amount b if they choose 
to work more than H * hours, where wH* = SGA , creating a discontinuous drop in net income at 
the SGA threshold. An increase in the SGA level to wH *' would lead to higher net income for 
those working between H *  and H * '  hours, since they would now be eligible to receive benefits. 
Under the benefit offset, individuals could work even more than H * '  and still receive benefits, 
although the benefits would be reduced by $1 for each $2 increase in earnings until hours exceed 
B  and benefits are zero. 
Generally, (medically eligible) individuals maximize utility by choosing the combination 
of program participation and hours of work such that their indifference curves (not shown in the 
figure) are tangent to the budget constraint. However, some individuals who would choose to 




                                                 
to qualify for SSDI benefits under the current policy. Individuals’ “breakeven points” – at which 
they are just indifferent between program participation (with reduced work hours) and non-
participation – depend on utility parameters that cannot be estimated without data on individuals’ 
wages, hours and program participation decisions.5  Without these parameters, it is difficult to 
relate induced entry from an SGA change directly to potential induced entry from a benefit 
offset. However, if we make some assumptions about individuals’ potential wages, then we can 
make some approximate comparisons. 
While at first glance it appears that the benefit offset would affect a larger hours region of 
the budget constraint than a change in the SGA threshold, and thus encourage more program 
entrants, it is important to realize that the points H * , H * '  and B  depend critically on the 
individual’s wage rate.6 For example, an individual earning approximately the minimum wage of 
$5 per hour in 1999 would have to work more than 100 hours per month ( H * ) to exceed the 
SGA threshold value of $500 before July 1999, and more than 140 hours per month ( H * ' ) to 
exceed the SGA threshold value of $700 after July 1999. In contrast, a $1 for $2 benefit offset 
for earnings above the original SGA level of $500 per month would not exhaust benefits until 
500 hours ( B ). But if we assume that there are 40 workable hours in a week, then there are no 
more than 160 workable hours in a month ( Hmax ). Thus, for individuals with low potential 
wages, the benefit offset and SGA change affect approximately the same hours region of the 
budget constraint. Individuals with higher wage rates will have correspondingly lower values of 
H * , H * '  and B , and thus a larger fraction of the total hours region would be affected by a 
benefit offset relative to an SGA change.  
5  See Maestas, Mullen and Zamarro (2010) for a more detailed discussion. 
	
6  Note that under a benefit offset these new entrants would still have to be willing to reduce their work hours below 












    
 
                                                 
         
           
     
     
  
   
 
       
   
Thus, the potential wage determines the part of the budget constraint (hours region) that is 
relevant to prospective applicants. If wages are low, then individuals’ access to the benefit phase-
out region of the benefit offset is limited by the numbers of hours available to work; in this case, 
SGA-induced entry provides a relatively close approximation to likely induced entry from a 
benefit offset. If, on the other hand, wages are high, then SGA-induced entry is likely to be 
smaller than induced entry from a benefit offset. Since most SSDI beneficiaries have relatively 
low potential wages, it is reasonable to expect that SGA-induced entry should be close to 
potential induced entry from a benefit offset. 7,8 We also decompose the SGA-induced entry 
effect into new applications from different parts of the earnings distribution (i.e., below the old 
SGA level, between the old and new SGA levels, and above the new SGA level) in an attempt to 
shed light on how H *  and H * ' relate to Hmax , and thus how SGA-induced entry might relate to 
potential induced entry from a benefit offset. 
3. Data 
We make use of administrative applications data from SSA’s 831 Disability Files, which 
contain disability determination records for all SSDI applications from primary claimants only 
(excluding dependents and survivors) that pass an initial earnings screen performed at the local 
field office.9 The key variables included in the 831 files are filing date and state of residence, 
7 For example, Maestas, Mullen and Strand (2011) estimate that the average SSDI applicant in 2005-2006 earned
only $22,000 annually in 2008 dollars in the three to five years prior to filing. Assuming 40 hours per week, this
corresponds to an hourly wage rate of $8.19, deflated to 1999 dollars. 
8 An additional difference between the effect of an SGA increase and a benefit offset, not represented in Figure 3, is 
that for people with potential earnings between the old and the new SGA threshold, an increase in the SGA would 
delay their completion of the TWP. In contrast, the benefit offset policy would have no effect on the duration of the 
TWP. 
9 A limitation of our data set is that it does not include application attempts made by individuals who are ineligible 
to receive benefits because they currently earn more than the SGA threshold. This might tell us something about the 









                                                                                                                      




   
                                       
 
which we use to construct application counts by month and state. We include applications filed 
by previous applicants. We examine applications filed between January 1, 1988, and December 
31, 2000.10 To construct application rates, we obtained state and national population counts from
the U.S. Census Bureau. 
In addition to the applications data, we compiled time series for several variables which
could influence SSDI applications, including seasonally adjusted state and national 
unemployment rates from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), as well as published statistics on 
SSDI program parameters including allowance rates (initial and overall), average benefit levels, 
and recovery/termination rates from the 2000 and 2010 Annual Statistical Reports of the Social 
Security Disability Insurance Program and a recent SSA actuarial study (Zayatz, 2011). We used 
the Consumer Price Index published by BLS to convert nominal SGA levels to real SGA levels 
and data on state-level average wages for all employees, also obtained from BLS, to construct 
measures of real relative SGA levels, as described below. Table 1 presents summary statistics of 
these data at a national level for each year 1988-2000. 
Finally, in order to examine how applications relate to applicants’ earnings just prior to 
application, we obtained counts of applications filed in December conditional on annual nominal 
earnings in the current year (January-December) grouped into one of four categories: (1) below 
$3,600, the annualized pre-1990 SGA threshold; (2) between $3,600 and $6,000, the annualized 
1990 SGA threshold; (3) between $6,000 and $8,400, the annualized 1999 SGA threshold; and 
(4) above $8,4000. These counts were created using matched data from the 831 files and SSA’s 
Detailed Earnings Record, which contains uncapped annual earnings from box 5 (Medicare 
their current earnings below the threshold by reducing their hours or quitting their job, we do not believe this 
presents a substantial barrier for serious applicants. 
10 The reason we limit our analysis to applications filed before 2001 is because the SGA moved from nominal to real
terms in 2001 when it was indexed to annual average wages in the U.S. This changed the fundamental nature of the 












wages and tips) of individuals’ W-2 forms. Because the earnings data contain annual (calendar 
year) earnings, we focus on applications filed in December only in order to isolate earnings in 
the year prior to filing the SSDI application. 
4. Methods and Empirical Results 
In this section we describe the methods used and report estimates of the effect of 
increasing SGA levels on SSDI applications. We follow three complementary approaches. First, 
we study how national SSDI application counts relate to real SGA levels at a monthly frequency, 
after controlling for macroeconomic trends and program parameters. Second, we exploit 
variation across states in real relative SGA levels due to differences in local average wages; for 
these models we regress annual SSDI application counts at the state level, both in levels and 
changes, on real relative SGA levels, controlling for state and year fixed effects in order to 
isolate variation within states over time. Finally, we examine changes in the distribution of prior 
earnings among SSDI applicants before and after the 1990 and 1999 SGA changes. Specifically, 
we test for changes in applications among individuals divided into four earnings categories— 
below the pre-1990 SGA level, between the pre-1990 and 1990 SGA levels, between the 1990 
and 1999 SGA levels, and above the 1999 SGA level—in an attempt to discern whether the 
estimated SGA-induced entry effects are likely to provide a reasonable approximation to 
potential induced entry from a benefit offset. 
4.1.Analysis of Monthly Application Counts Using Real SGA Changes Over Time 
As a first step in analyzing how the SGA threshold relates to SSDI applications, Figure 4 





seasonal pattern to SSDI applications with more applications filed in the Spring and Summer and 
fewer in the Fall and Winter months. During this time period, applications approximately 
doubled, from around 60,000 per month in the late 1980s to 125,000 per month in 2003, but 
there was considerable variation over this period, with applications increasing until the mid-90s, 
then decreasing until about 1998 and increasing again thereafter. In this paper, we restrict our 
attention to applications filed before January 2001, at which point the SGA was indexed to 
average wages.  
The two large SGA changes took place in January 1990 and July 1999. Although the 
1990 change appears to be associated with an increase in applications, this also coincided with an 
increase in the national unemployment rate (secondary axis of Figure 4). The 1999 change 
occurred in a time of falling unemployment and there is no discernable change in application 
counts around this period. 
To quantify these effects, we estimate regression models of monthly SSDI application 
counts on the real SGA threshold in 2009 dollars, controlling for unemployment and program-
level variables such as the overall allowance rate, the average monthly SSDI benefit and the 
program exit rate due to “recovery” (i.e., terminations from the program resulting from earning 
above SGA or failing a continuing disability review). We include month and year fixed effects in 
all regressions to control for seasonal variation and trends in applications over time. Table 2 
presents the estimates. The first column reports the results of a regression of SSDI application 
counts on the real SGA threshold only, without any control variables. We find that a $1 increase 
is associated with a statistically insignificant 3 additional applications per month. Thus, a $250 
change of approximately the same size (in real terms) as the 1999 SGA increase is associated





(annual) unemployment rate as a control the estimated effect of the real SGA level increases to 
just over 4 applications per $1 increase, or an additional 1,000 applications per month associated 
with an increase of the same magnitude as the 1999 SGA increase—just over a 1% increase in 
applications and still statistically insignificant. On the other hand, a 1 percentage point increase 
in the unemployment rate is associated with a statistically significant increase of approximately 
4,500 SSDI applications per month. Adding (annual) program-level variables to capture other 
features of the SSDI program does not affect the coefficient on the real SGA threshold, although 
the overall allowance rate and average monthly benefit are both associated with large and 
statistically significant increases in SSDI applications.11    
A drawback of this approach is that it uses only variation in the real SGA threshold over 
time stemming from depreciation due to inflation and two large increases due to policy changes. 
However, it is difficult to separate changes in applications due to changes in the (real) SGA level 
from other confounding factors such as changes in the job environment over time. In addition, 
although the monthly frequency brings a tight focus on changes just before and after the policy 
changes, it is also a fairly noisy measure of applications, making it difficult to obtain precise 
estimates of the effect of SGA levels on SSDI applications. In the next subsection, we pursue a 
different, but complementary, approach, by relating annual application rates to real relative SGA 
differences at the state level. 
                                                 
      
      
 
4.2. Analysis of Annual Application Counts Using Relative SGA Changes Across States 
We estimate models of the following type to assess how changes in the SGA affect the 
fraction of individuals applying for SSDI benefits: 




    
 
α μ δ  s β st  SSDI st  = + +  t unemployment st  + SGA +εst , (1) 
where SSDIst is the rate of SSDI applications per 1,000 individuals in state s at time t. The term 
αt  is a year fixed effect capturing common factors such as macroeconomic conditions that 
influence SSDI applications in each year. In the same way, μs  is a state fixed effect and controls 
for state-specific components of application flows that are constant over time. The regression 
specification also includes state- and year-specific unemployment rates. The key explanatory 
variable is SGAst  which represents the real relative SGA level in state s at time t. The real 
relative SGA measure is constructed by dividing the annualized real SGA level by a moving 
average of three years of real annual wages in each state. We exclude the year 1999 because the 
SGA did not change until midway through that year. By considering real relative SGA levels we 
exploit two sources of variation in the SGA threshold—variation over time as well as variation 
across states due to differences in average wages. Importantly, the period 1988-2000 contains 
periods of both real (and nominal) increases and real decreases in the SGA threshold. 
As a first illustration, Figures 5A and 5B show how applications in 1998, before the 1999 
SGA increase, and in 2000, after the 1999 increase, relate to real relative SGA levels. As we can 
see in these figures, there is a positive correlation among applications and real relative SGA 
levels that becomes more accentuated after the 1999 SGA increase. Figures 6A and 6B show 
how changes in applications relate to changes in the real relative SGA levels between 1996 and 
1998, when the real SGA fell while the nominal SGA remained constant, and between 1998 and 
2000, when the SGA increased in both nominal and real terms. Although it is difficult to see a 
relationship between changes in applications and changes in the real relative SGA in years when 





1999 SGA increase. In other words, the states that experienced large increases in the real relative 
SGA level are the same states that experienced large increases in SSDI applications. 
While suggestive, these correlations may be contaminated by differential trends over 
time, across states, or by macroeconomic conditions affecting the number of applications such as 
the unemployment rate. To control for these, we estimate equation (1) above, for all SSDI 
applications and separately for SSI-concurrent and SSDI only cases, respectively. Table 3 
presents the results. The regression estimates imply that a one percentage point increase in the 
real relative SGA is associated with 0.11 new SSDI applications per 1,000 individuals and that 
these are almost equally divided between concurrent and SSDI only applications. This implies 
that an increase on par with the 1999 SGA change, which increased real relative SGA levels by 7 
percentage points on average, may have increased SSDI applications by as much as 19%.12 We 
also estimated regressions using a narrow range of years surrounding the 1990 and 1999 SGA 
increases, respectively, to try to isolate periods where the real relative SGA level increased. 
Specifically, we estimate regressions restricted to the years 1988-1991 and 1998-2000 (omitting 
1999 as before), presented in the last two columns of Table 3. The estimates of these regressions 
suggest that the 1999 SGA increase was associated with a much larger increase in SSDI 
applications than the 1990 increase.13  
A potential problem with the regressions above is that they do not control for state-
specific trends in SSDI applications that may be correlated with changes in real relative SGA 
levels which are driven largely by changes in average wages over time. For this reason, we 
estimate the same regressions in first differences. That is, we relate the change in SSDI 
                                                 
        
    
  
12 We arrive at 19% by multiplying the regression coefficient 0.111 by the real relative SGA increase of 7 

percentage points and dividing by the average rate of SSDI applications per 1,000 individuals (4)

13 We also estimated regressions of the log of the number of applications instead of the rate of applications per 1,000 











applications from year t-1 to year t ( ΔSSDIst ) to the change in the real relative SGA level in state 
s ( ΔSGAst ), controlling for state-specific trends in SSDI applications using state fixed effects. To 
construct the change in SSDI applications between 1998 and 1999, we annualize the total 
number of SSDI applications filed in January-June 1999; similarly, to construct the change in 
SSDI applications between 1999 and 2000, we annualize the total number of SSDI applications 
filed in July-December 1999.14   
Estimates of this model are presented in Table 4. The estimated coefficients on the real 
relative SGA in levels are much smaller once we control for state-specific trends in SSDI 
applications and they imply that the 1999 SGA increase led to an approximately 4.7% increase in 
SSDI applications (significant at the 10% level).15 Whereas the model in levels attributed the 
increase in applications equally to changes in concurrent and SSDI only cases, the model in 
changes attributes the increase in total SSDI applications almost entirely to changes in 
applications among non-concurrent SSDI only cases. Estimates of the first-difference 
specification restricted to years focused around the 1990 and 1999 SGA increases, respectively, 
are small and imprecisely estimated.  
14  We also estimated models excluding 1999 and found similar results. 

15  We arrive at 4.7% by multiplying the regression coefficient 0.027 by the average real relative SGA increase of 7 

percentage points in 1999, and dividing by the average number of applications per 1,000 individuals (4). 
	
4.3. Analysis of Prior Earnings Relative to SGA Levels, Before and After 1990 and 1999 
14
Finally, we attempt to decompose the SGA-induced entry effect into new SSDI 
applications from applicants with earnings in the prior year that fell below the old SGA level, 
between the old and new SGA levels, and above the new SGA level. Specifically, we examine 












changes over time in SSDI applications filed in December conditional on (nominal) earnings in 
the year prior to filing falling into one of four categories: (1) below the pre-1990 annualized 
SGA threshold; (2) between the pre-1990 and 1990 annualized SGA thresholds; (3) between the 
1990 and 1999 annualized SGA thresholds; and (4) above the 1999 annualized SGA threshold. 
We use prior year earnings as a proxy for earnings in the absence of SSDI (see Figure 3). 
Economic theory predicts that applicants whose earnings in the absence of SSDI fall 
below the old SGA threshold would have no reason to alter their behavior under an increased 
SGA threshold and thus would apply in the same numbers. Thus, SGA-induced applications 
should be concentrated entirely among applications with prior/counterfactual earnings above the 
old SGA threshold. The extent to which applications are concentrated between the old and new 
SGA thresholds may provide a clue as to the relative size of the benefit offset effect compared 
with the SGA-induced entry effect by revealing how much of the benefit phase-out region is 
populated by individuals on the margin of application for SSDI benefits. If SGA-induced 
entrants are concentrated between the old and new SGA levels, then it is reasonable to expect 
that the SGA-induced entry effect is a relatively good approximation to potential induced entry 
from a benefit offset. In 1990 and 1999, the changes in real SGA were similar in both levels and 
changes (see Table 1) so we expect the two natural experiments to tell the same story in terms of
where the new SSDI applications were concentrated in the earnings distribution relative to the 
old and new SGA levels.
Figure 7 displays the application counts for each of the four earnings categories between 
1988 and 2000. Recall that the national unemployment rate increased sharply just after the 1990 
SGA increase, whereas the unemployment rate was falling smoothly around the time of the 1999 













                                                 




   
 
board for each earnings category in 1990, while applications fell among all but the highest 
earning groups in 1999. 
Since the SGA policy changes were implemented nationally, there is no control group. 
However, we can estimate changes in applications for the highest three earnings groups relative
to the lowest earnings group, which we hypothesize should have been unaffected by the SGA 
policy changes. If this is true, then any changes relative to the lowest earnings group before and 
after the policy change, net of relative changes in non-policy years, can be attributed to the SGA 
policy change. To formalize this, we estimate the following regression: 
ΔSSDIgt  =α g + βg I (t = 1990) + γ g I (t = 1999) +δΔunemploymentt + ε , gt  
where g indexes earnings group (where the lowest earnings group is omitted) and t indexes 
year, from 1989 to 2000.16 
Table 5 presents the results of this regression. The first column displays the estimated 
coefficients, while the second column displays the total estimated change in applications for each 
earnings group in 1990 and 1999, respectively, using the “difference-in-difference” estimate of 
the change in applications relative to the lowest earnings group in 1990/1999 vs. non-policy 
change years (i.e., by adding the 1990/1999 dummy to the interacted earnings group dummy). 
We have highlighted the estimated effects for the earnings group between the old and new SGA 
levels for 1990 and 1999, respectively. While we estimate that most of the new applications in 
1990 are drawn from the upper part of the earnings distribution, far from the old and new SGA 
levels, the 1999 estimates tell the opposite story—new applications are drawn from the lower 
part of the earnings distribution. However, none of the estimated earnings effects are significant, 
16 We also estimated a model where we pooled the 1990 and 1999 changes. Specifically, we focused on changes for 
three years surrounding the 1990 and 1999 policy changes aggregating into three groups (below the old SGA level, 
between the old and new SGA levels and above the new SGA levels) where the SGA levels were taken from the 
appropriate year. The results were qualitatively the same. 
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and indeed many of the hypothesized effects are estimated to have the wrong sign. Without 
higher frequency data on earnings, it is difficult to conclude anything meaningful about the 
relative size of potential induced entry from a benefit offset from these analyses. 
5. Conclusion 
Recent alarming growth in SSDI program participation has prompted policy makers to 
propose changing the program’s work disincentives to encourage beneficiaries to re-enter the 
labor market and become less dependent on SSDI benefits. However, a potential unintended 
consequence of such a policy change may be to encourage non-beneficiaries to newly enroll in 
the program. In this paper, we examine how SSDI application rates have responded to past 
policy changes in order to gauge potential induced entry effects if SSA were to implement a 
proposed $1 for $2 benefit offset. In particular, we estimate the effect of changes in a related 
program parameter – the earnings threshold for Substantial Gainful Activity (SGA), above which 
applicants and beneficiaries are disqualified from program participation.
We take several approaches to estimating SGA-induced entry effects. First, we analyze 
monthly application counts at a national level controlling for macroeconomic trends and 
program-level variables such as allowance rate, benefit generosity and exit rate due to recovery 
as defined by SSA. The findings are consistent with a small positive effect, but the monthly 
frequency is too noisy to be able to draw meaningful conclusions. The next set of analyses use an 
annual frequency and exploit variation in real relative SGA levels at the state level driven by 
state-by-state differences in annual average wages. Our preferred regression specification of the 
effect of real relative SGA on SSDI application rates in first differences controls for state-
specific trends in SSDI application rates. We find that a 7 percentage point increase in the real 
17
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relative SGA – the same magnitude of the 1999 increase in nominal SGA threshold from $500 to 
$700 per month – is associated with a 4.7% increase in SSDI applications. This estimate is likely 
to be a good approximation of potential induced entry from a benefit offset to the degree that the 
marginal applicant has low potential wages, and is roughly in line with previous estimates of 
induced entry from a benefit offset  
18
18















   
 
 
   
 
References 
Autor D. and M. Duggan, M. (2003) “The rise in the disability rolls and the decline in 
unemployment”, Quarterly Journal of Economics February 2003: 157-205. 
Benitez-Silva, Hugo, Moshe Buchinsky, and John Rust. 2006. Induced Entry Effects of a $1 for 
$2 Offset in SSDI Benefits. Manuscript, State University of New York–Stony Brook. 
Black, Dan, Kermit Daniel, and Seth Sanders. 2002. The Impact of Economic Conditions on 
Participation in Disability Programs: Evidence from the Coal Bust and Boom. The 
American Economic Review 92(1): 27–50. 
Duggan M., Singleton, P. and J. Song (2007) “Aching to Retire? The rise in the full retirement 
age and its impact on the social security disability rolls”, Journal of Public Economics 91: 
1327-1350. 
Hoynes, Hilary W., and Robert Moffitt. 1999. Tax Rates and Work Incentives in the Social 
Security Disability Insurance Program: Current Law and Alternative Reforms. National 
Tax Journal 52(4): 623–654. 
Maestas, Nicole, Kathleen Mullen and Alexander Strand, 2011. “Does Disability Insurance 
Receipt Discourage Work? Using Examiner Assignment to Estimate Causal Effects of 
SSDI Receipt.” MRRC Working Paper 2010-241. 
Maestas, Nicole, Kathleen Mullen, and Gema Zamarro. 2010. “Research Designs for Estimating 
Induced Entry into the SSDI Program Resulting from a Benefit Offset.” Santa Monica, 
CA: RAND Labor and Population Technical Report, TR-908-SSA. 
McLaughlin, James R. 1994. Estimated Increase in OASDI Benefit Payments That Would Result 
from Two “Earnings Test” Type Alternatives to the Current Criteria for Cessation of
Disability Benefits-Information. SSA Memorandum. 
Schimmel, Jody, David C. Stapleton and Jae Song, 2009. “How Common is `Parking’ Among 
Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) Beneficiaries? Evidence from the 1999 
Change in the Level of Substantial Gainful Activity (SGA).” MRRC Working Paper 
2009-220. 
Tuma, Nancy. 2001. Approaches to Evaluating Induced Entry into a New SSDI Program with a 
$1 Reduction in Benefits for Each $2 in Earnings. Manuscript, Stanford University. 
Zayatz, Tim (2011). “Social Security Disability Insurance Program Worker Experience,” 


























Table 1. Summary Statistics 
SSDI Applications SSDI Appl. Allowance rate Recovery 
Real Rate (per Average Real Avg. Rate (per 
Real SGA Relative Concurrent 1,000 Pop. Unemploy. Monthly 1,000 
Year (2009$) SGA (%) SSDI Only with SSI Total Ages 18‐ Rate Initial Overall Benefit Ben.) 
1988 544.05 17.87 412,133 384,687 796,820 N/A 5.5 N/A 40.2 960.25 13.0 
1989 519.04 17.32 439,555 399,433 838,988 N/A 5.3 N/A 43.2 961.95 10.5 
1990 820.72 27.62 467,672 457,846 925,518 6.0 5.6 39 43.8 963.85 9.9 
1991 787.58 26.54 517,051 556,999 1,074,050 6.9 6.9 42 44.4 959.90 8.3 
1992 764.57 25.26 547,742 610,601 1,158,343 7.4 7.5 43 47.7 957.39 8.6 
1993 742.34 24.76 548,554 659,037 1,207,591 7.6 6.9 39 44.6 952.72 7.9 
1994 723.81 24.15 572,464 649,837 1,222,301 7.7 6.1 34 43.8 957.46 9.0 
1995 703.86 23.39 548,504 597,547 1,146,051 7.1 5.6 31 48.3 959.50 11.1 
1996 683.67 22.56 574,887 586,009 1,160,896 7.2 5.4 31 48.8 962.47 11.3 
1997 668.34 21.58 530,646 498,122 1,028,768 6.3 4.9 32 49.8 964.55 22.7 
1998 658.09 20.61 532,112 484,366 1,016,478 6.1 4.5 35 52.0 964.89 10.7 
1999 901.42* 27.80 554,936 481,531 1,036,467 6.2 4.2 37 51.7 971.09 11.6 
2000 872.10 26.54 595,608 511,871 1,107,479 6.5 4.0 38 46.7 979.74 13.4 
Sources:  Tabulations  from  831  File  (SSDI  applications),  Census  population  estimates  (denominator  for  application  rate),  Bureau  of  Labor  




                   
       
   
     



































         
           
                  
  
 
Table 2. Regression of Monthly SSDI Applications on Real SGA 
(1) (2) (3) 
Real SGA (2009 $) 2.948 4.191 4.182 
(10.8) (10.7) (10.7) 
Unemployment Rate 4520** 4520** 
(1862.0) (1862.0) 
Overall Allowance Rate 1497*** 
(189.0) 
Real Avg. Monthly Benefit 1107*** 
(215.0) 
Recovery Rate 221.7 
(156.0)
Constant 78177*** 73137*** ‐1091485*** 
(9732.0) (12274.0) (211245.0) 
Observations 156 156 156 
R‐squared 0.89 0.90 0.90 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 



































                         













































Year Fixed Effects 














































































































Chan  ge in Relative
Real  SGA (MA) 0.027*  0.007  0.020***  0.044  -0.021
  (0.014) (0.009) (0.007) (0.029) (0.039)
Chan ge in 
Unemployment 0.001***   0.000**  0.000***  0.001 -0.000
 Rate
  (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.001) (0.001)
Cons tant   0.176  0.234**  -0.058  0.689*** 0.4 2 
  (0.157) (0.099) (0.071) (0.060) (0 .29) 
 Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Y es
 Observations 561 561   561  102 153

















 relative  to  bottom 
 Coefficient  earnings   group  
 1990 Dummy  807.403    
(2252.386)    
1990*(Earnings  in   $300‐$500) ‐2,419.90 ‐1,612.5     0
(3055.432) (2252.386    ) 
 1990*(Earnings  in $500‐$700) ‐2,495.40 ‐1,688.0     0
(3055.432) (2252.386    ) 
 1990*(Earnings  >  $700) 2,517.10 3,324.5     0
(3055.432) (2252.386    ) 
 1999 Dummy ‐512.821    
(2163.996)    
 1999*(Earnings  in  $300‐$500) 814.1 301.27     9
(3055.432) (2163.996)    
1999*(Earnings  in   $500‐$700) 789.6 276.77     9
(3055.432) (2163.996    ) 
 1999*(Earnings  >  $700) 196.1 ‐316.72     1
(3055.432) (2163.996)    
Earnings  in   $300‐$500 61.9 
(921.247) 
Earnings  in   $500‐$700 68.4 
(921.247) 
Earnings   >  $700 1,416.90 
(921.247) 





R‐squared  0.38      
Standard  errors  in  parentheses  
***  p<0.01,  **  p<0.05,  *  p<0.1  
Note:  Omitted  category  is  earnings  <  $300.  Shading  identifies  group  earning  
between  old  and  new  SGA  levels  in  1990  and  1999,  respectively.  
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Figure 1. Real Substantial Gainful Activity (SGA)Amount by
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Change in SGA in 1999 as % of Avg Annual Wage in State in 1998
 
Figure 2A. Density of Relative Changes in SGA by State in
1999 (% of state average annual wage) 
 
        
 
 
Figure 2B. Density of Relative Changes in SGA by State in




















      
  
Figure 3. SSDI Budget Constraint Before and After SGA
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Figure 5A. Applications in 1998 by State and Relative SGA 
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Figure 5B. Applications in 2000 by State and Relative SGA 
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Figure 6A. Changes in State Applications between 1998 and 
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Figure 6B. Changes in State Applications between 2000 and 
1998 and Change in State Relative SGA 
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